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Physician-Assisted Death Legislation: Issues and Initial Responses
In two landmark rulings issued in the summer of 1 997, the Supreme Court
determined that legislators, not courts, should determine whether physician-assisted death
should be permitted. Oregon is currently the only state in which physician-assisted death
is legal, but at least 10 other states considered (but did not enact) bills in 1997 that would
legalize the practice, and many more are certain to revisit the issue in upcoming years in
light of the Supreme Court's rulings. This paper examines the key problems that
legislation to establish physician-assisted death must confront — that is, the important
implementation issues that are nearly always ignored in the broader debate over the
morality and efficacy of physician-assisted death. As a point of reference, the paper
reviews, contrasts, and critiques the Oregon assisted suicide law and the 10 proposals
recently considered in other states.

Physician-Assisted Death Legislation:
Issues and Preliminary Responses
Russell Korobkin
Introduction
In long-anticipated decisions, the United States Supreme Court concluded its last
term by finding Constitutional New York and Washington state laws that criminalize the
act of physician-assisted death ("PAD"). The Court's unanimous rulings in Vacco v.
QuilV and Washington v. Glucksberg^ do not pass judgment on the ethics or desirability
of PAD, but merely express a consensus among a jurisprudentially conservative set of
Justices that the United States Constitution has nothing to say about the issue one way or
another. The right to die, so says the High Court, is a matter for the people and their
legislatures, not courts, to debate and resolve.
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1 17 S.Ct. 2293(1997).
^ 117 S.Ct. 2258(1997).
In November, 1997, the citizens of Oregon responded to the Supreme Court's
return of the issue to the states by voting to retain that state's "Death \\ith Dignity Act,"
an initiative-established PAD lav^' that was narrov^'ly approved by voters in 1994 and tied
up in litigation ever since. ^ Oregon was in 1994, and is still today, the only state to have
legalized PAD. It is a fair prediction, though, that Oregon will not stand alone for long.
In the wake of the Supreme Court's recent rulings, legislation seeking to legalize PAD
will be proposed and seriously considered during the coming years in virtually every
state.
The question of whether or not PAD is sound policy has been considered
elsewhere in detail and will not be repeated here. Instead, this article examines the issues
that legislation proposing to legalize PAD must confront. The cliche that "the devil is in
the details" is true nowhere more than it is in the case of PAD; even if supported in
theor>' by legislative majorities, "right to die" legislation must resolve a series of complex
definitional and implementation issues.
In grappling with these issues, policy makers need not etch on a clean slate.
Oregon' Death with Dignity Act can serve as a departure for debate, of course, but a
surprising number of other proposals have been put forward as well. During the course
of 1997 alone, legislation designed to legalize PAD was introduced in ten other states.
Although none of these bills were voted out of committee, the ten, along with the Oregon
Act (collectively the "state bills"), provide context in which to explore the legislative
issues that PAD raises. A review of these bills suggests that there are four critical sets of
' See. f .^' , Judith Graham and Judy Peres. Assisted-Suicide Door Opens Wide. CHI. Trib.. Nov.
6, 1997, at sec. 1, 1.
substantive issues'* that PAD legislation must confront: (1) what role physicians will play
in PAD, (2) which patients will qualify for PAD, (3) which physicians may aid a patient
requesting PAD, and (4) what procedures patients and physicians must follow before
PAD can be granted. All of the bills confront these issues to some degree, but none
adequately resolve all of the difficult implementation issues. The state bills, then, should
serve simultaneously as examples of how to and how not to establish a PAD regime.
They should provide guidance for future legislative initiatives, but none should be seen as
a perfected model.
Legislative Issues, State Responses
I. Physician Involvement in Death.
The most fundamental issue that "right to die" legislation must confront is
whether it will be limited to PAD, in which the physician prescribes a lethal dose of
medication but the patient must self-administer the dose, or extend to active voluntary
euthanasia, in which the physician may administer the lethal dose to the patient who
requests death, most likely in the form of a lethal injection. The more limited right to
PAD is what the plaintiffs in Glucksberg and Quill sought; the latter is officially
condoned (although technically illegal) in the Netherlands.'
The arguments for limiting legislation to PAD tend to be pragmatic in nature.*
Legalizing voluntary euthanasia (rather than just PAD) would substantially raise the risk
There are also 'wnporX&nX. procedural issues, such as how to monitor and enforce the law's
boundaries, that will not be considered here.
See generally John Keown, Euthanasia in the Netherlands: sliding down the slippery slope, in
Euthanasia Examined: Ethical, Clinical and Legal Perspectives 261 (John keown, ed.,
1995).
That is, those who oppose active voluntary euthanasia on moral or ethical grounds tend to
opposed PAD also and on the same or similar grounds.
that individuals who do not want to die (or, at least, do not express a preference for
dying) would be put to death by mistake. Legalizing voluntar. euthanasia would also
increase the risk of coercion or outright murder of the ill and/or the elderly by rendering it
difficult to distinguish involunian. deaths from those that were truly voluntar>/ The
argument for permitting voluntar> euthanasia in addition to PAD, in contrast, rests
largely on the theoretical principle of horizontal equity--that individuals in "like"
circumstances should be treated alike by the law. PAD, by its nature, is restricted to
those who are not so ill or incapacitated that they are unable to self-administer the lethal
medication. Legalizing PAD but not voluntar>' euthanasia could be viewed as
discriminating against incapacitated individuals, even though they have a moral claim to
the right to end their lives that is equally strong (or perhaps even stronger, due to their
incapacity) as that of individuals who are not incapacitated.*
To date, the pragmatic arguments have prevailed over the theoretical. Of the
eleven state bills, ten limit the right to die to PAD, and most of these explicitly state that
they do not condone or authorize lethal injection, mercy killing, or active euthanasia.'
The Nebraska bill stands out as distinctly different from the other ten by explicitly
permitting voluntary euthanasia. It provides that an individual may provide an "adxanced
directive" that requests aid-in-dying if he or she becomes terminally ill.'" "Aid-in-dying"
See, e.g., Keown, supra note 5 at 262 (describing the argument that a line between voluntan,
and involuntar> euthanasia would be difficult to maintain in practice): Charles H. Baron, et al., A
Model Slate Acl to Authorize and Regulate Physician-Assisted Suicide, 33 Harv. J. LEG. 1,10
(1996) (arguing that restricting legislation to PAD provides "a stronger assurance of the patient's
voluntary' resolve to die").
* See Franklin G. Miller, et al., Regulating Physician-Assisted Death, 331 N.E.J.M. 119 (1994).
' OR Act § 3.14; 1997 IL H.B. 691 § 5; 1997 HI H.B. 2204 § 17; 1997 ME H.B. 663 § S.
917(A); 1997 Ml S.B. 81 § 8(29); 1997 VT H.B. § 2; WA S.B. 5654 § 23, The Maine bill
somewhat contradictorily suggests that patient who cannot self-administer medication may elect
another person to "assist in the administration of medication." 1997 ME H.B. 663 § 5-9 17(B).
10 1997NEL.B. 406 §3(3), 3(11).
is in turn defined as "the administration by a physician of a lethal injection or a lethal
dose of medication that . . . will terminate the life of the declarant in a painless, humane,
and dignified manner."" The overwhelming support among the state bills for the more
limited right to PAD likely reflects a political calculation that the more limited right
would generate greater public support. Oregon's Death with Dignity Act as originally
drafted would have permitted active voluntary euthanasia, but this provision was dropped
by supporters of the initiative, apparently out of fear that it would jeopardize the
initiative's chance of passage.'^
Legislation that distinguishes between assisted suicide and voluntary euthanasia
invites a Constitutional challenge on the grounds that it discriminates against patients on
the basis of the logically irrelevant difference in their ability to self-administer a lethal
dosage of medication, but such a challenge is unlikely to succeed.'^ When legislation
distinguishes between two classes of individuals and neither has been identified as a
"suspect class" (i.e. racial minorities), the equal protection clause of the Constitution's
14 Amendment is satisfied if the distinction merely "bears a rational relation to some
legitimate [governmental] end,"''' traditionally an easy hurdle for legislation to clear.
Proponents of legislation limited to assisted suicide can contend that the distinction
between PAD and euthanasia serves a state's interest in protecting vulnerable individuals
from an unwanted death, which is more likely to result if euthanasia is permitted than if
only assisted suicide is allowed. Such a distinction is almost certain to pass the very
minimal "rationality review" that courts are likely to give it.
" /^.§3(1).
'^ See Rita L. Marker and Wesley J. Smith, The Art of Verbal Engineering, 35 DUQUESNE L.
Rev. 81,88(1996).
'^ But see Jack Schwarz, Writing the Rules ofDeath: State Regulation ofPhysician Assisted
Suicide, 24 J. L. Med. & ETHICS 207, 211 (1996) (suggesting that the "illogic[al]" distinction
between assisted suicide and euthanasia is unlikely to survive judicial review).
'" Quill, 117 S.Ct. at 2297 {quoting Romer v. Evans, 1 16 S.Ct. 1620, 1627 (1996)).
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II. Qualifving Patients
1 . Health Status
In Glucksberg and Quill, the plaintiffs seeking to overturn the Washington and
New \'ork laws prohibiting PAD alleged that they were "terminally ill"; that is. that they
were told by their doctors that they had only a short time to live.'^ In fact, none of the
patients who were plaintiffs when either case was filed sur\'ived to hear the Supreme
Court render its decisions in those cases. '^ But there is. of course, nothing inherent in the
concept of PAD that requires the practice to be limited to the terminally ill. ' In theory,
PAD could be made available to all individuals who decide they would prefer death to
life, it could be circumscribed in some way but offered to a broader class of individuals
than the terminally ill, or it could be circumscribed and offered to a class of individuals
that excluded the terminally ill.
Model legislation proposed by a group of academicians (the "Harvard Model
Law" or "HML") proposes that PAD be available to patients with either a terminal illness
or an "intractable and unbearable illness."" It defines the latter as a "bodily disorder (1)
that cannot be cured or successfully palliated, and (2) that causes such severe suffering
that a patient prefers death."" Notwithstanding the academic support for an expansion of
PAD to this broader class of individuals, all eleven state bills explicitly limit the
availability of PAD to the terminally ill. Most of these (Oregon. Hawaii. Massachusetts,
" GlucLsher^. 1 1 7 S.Ct. at 2261-62, Quili 117 S.Ct. at 2296.
" Gluchher^. 1 ! 7 S.Ct. at 2261 ; i)uili 1 1 7 S.Ct. at 2296.
See, e.g., Yale Kamisar, Physician-Assisted Suicide: The Last Bridge to Active Voluntary
Euthanasia, in EUTHANASIA EXAMINED: ETHICAI., CLINICAL, AND LEGAL PERSPECTIVES 225,
234 (John Keown, ed. 1995).
" Baron, supra note 7, (§ 3(aX2)).
" M at 25 (§ 2(d)).
Maine, Nebraska, Wisconsin) define "terminal illness" as a condition that will lead to
death within six months, according to reasonable medical prediction.'" Vermont defines a
terminal illness as one that will lead to death within a year;'' Washington defines such an
illness as one that will lead to death within a "reasonable period of time,"" and Illinois
calls a terminal illness one in which "death is imminent."'^
As a precaution designed to avoid errant medical determinations that a patient's
illness is terminal when in fact there is hope for recovery, all except the Nebraska bill
require that, in addition to the patient's treating physician diagnosing the patient's illness
as "terminal" under the statute, the treating physician refer the patient to a second
"consulting" physician to confirm the terminal nature of the diagnosis. The
Massachusetts bill, perhaps in a fit of excessive caution, requires a third confirming
opinion as to the terminal nature of the patient's illness.'''
2. Age of the Patient.
All eleven state bills further limit the class of citizens eligible for PAD by
specifying that the terminally ill must reach a certain age before qualifying for the
procedure. Nine of the bills place the age of consent at 18 (Connecticut, Hawaii, Illinois,
Maine, Michigan, Oregon, Vermont, Washington, and Wisconsin), although Illinois
would permit an exception for a minor who is legally emancipated." Nebraska would
^° OR Act § 1.01(12); 1997 ME H.B. 691 § 5-902(0); 1997 HI H.B. 2204 § 1; 1997MIS.B. 81 §
30(H); 1997 MA H.B. 1543 § 12DD(I); 1997 WI A.B. 32. §. 156.01(17); 1997NE L.B. 406 § 3
(11).
2' 1997 VT H.B. 109 §5280(11).
" 1997 WAS.B. 5654 §3(8).
" 1997 IL H.B. 691 § 10.
^* 1997 MA H.B. 1543 § 12GG(a).
" 1997 IL H.B. 691 § 10.
require a patient to be 19 years-old or emancipated,'' and Massachusetts would require a
patient to have reached the age of 21.^'
Importantly, none of the bills specify whether a terminally ill patient who has not
reached the age of consent is strictly ineligible for PAD, or whether a legal guardian can
provide legally valid consent. The failure of the legislation to specify' any method by
which a minor could become eligible for PAD suggests a legislative intent to exclude all
minors. In at least the Illinois and Nebraska bills, however, the exceptions to the age of
consent for emancipated minors could be read to imply that parental consent is possible
for those who have not reached the appropriate age, because emancipation laws generally
permit a minor to exercise rights that otherwise may be exercised by her legal guardian.
TTie Washington bill suggests a contrar>' position, providing that a "mentally competent
adult eighteen years of age or older" may request PAD and then that "no person other
than the qualified patient may request aid in dying for the qualified patient."^* Although
this language seems to indicate substitutive judgment is prohibited, it could be read to
prohibit substitutive judgment only if the patient is mentally competent and has reached
the age of majority.
3. Mental Competence .
Even ardent supporters of PAD agree that the option should not be available to
people who are not menially competent to choose it. But how should the law,
substantively and procedurally, attempt to guarantee competence? The inability of the
current bills to resolve this issue suggests both its complexity and a need for more
attention to be devoted to it in future legislative proposals.
^" 1997 NEL.B. 406 §3(2j.
^' 1997 MA H.B. 1543 § 12EE(b)(l).
" WAS.B. 5654§4(1),(2).
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a. Substantive Standards .
Nine of the state bills create a substantive standard that the patient should not be
suffering from a mental disorder or depression that "impairs"" or "distorts"'" the patient's
judgment.^' Unfortunately, none of these attempt to delineate the circumstances under
which a patient's judgment would be so impaired or distorted. These "impaired
judgment" standards presumably would disqualify delusional patients with no grasp on
reality from opting for PAD, and they presumably would not automatically disqualify
patients who suffer some depression as a direct result of their illnesses (a not unusual
circumstance^'). But the bills offer little if any legal guidance as to how medical
personnel should judge circimistances that fall between these polar extremes. What if, for
example, the patient who, due to an illness-created depression, appears to systematically
underweight the positive potential of life but has a general understanding of the pros and
cons of continuing to live?
Leaving determinations of whether a patient suffers from impaired judgment to
mental health professionals is unlikely to result in a coherent or consistent application of
PAD legislation. Except in extreme cases, even such professionals have difficulty
determining whether the judgment of seriously medically ill patients is impaired." The
^' See, e.g., OR Act § 3.03; 1997 ME H.B. 663 § 5-906.
^° See, e.g. 1997 IL H.B. 691 § 25(2).
The Washington bill fails to confront the subject of mental competence at all, an obvious
shortcoming in that proposal. The Nebraska bill is seems quite confused on the subject generally.
It specifies that only a "mentally competent" patient may execute an advance directive governing
aid-in-dying, 1997 NE L.B. 406 § 4(1), but does not define "mentally competent." Further, it
permits an attending physician who receives an aid-in-dying request to request a psychiatric
evaluation to determine the patient's mental competence, 1997 NE L.B. 406 § 13, but "mental
competence" appears only to be a requirement at the time the patient issues the advanced
directive, not at the time the physician is asked to provide PAD or euthanasia.
A majority of patients suffering from advanced forms of cancer have been reported to suffer
from psychiatric disorders of some kind. See Kathleen M. Foley, Editorial: Competent Carefor
the Dying Instead ofPhysician-Assisted Suicide, 336 N.E.J.M. 54, 56 (1997).
See L. Ganzini, et a\.. Attitudes ofOregon Psychiatrists Toward Physician -Assisted Suicide,
9
failure of the current crop of bills to seriously address the parameters of mental
competence to request PAD is perhaps their most serious shortcoming, and future
legislative proposals for PAD should include language that provides a more explicit and
useful legal standard forjudging mental competence. Current proposals, if enacted,
would constitute legislative abdication of what is - at least in many cases - an ethical
determination about what reasons for dying society should validate, rather than a medical
judgment.
The Massachusetts bill goes one step beyond the others, providing that distorted
judgment that would prevent a patient from opting for PAD can be caused not only by
mental illness or depression (or by alcohol or substance abuse), but also by
"homelessness, financial difficulties, or the absence of health care insurance adequate to
defray the cost of continuing health care."'" This provision raises a troubling question
skirted by the other PAD bills: may a patient opt for PAD in part because he fears that
continuing to live will create a financial burden for his loved-ones after he dies? It is
troubling to think that individuals will be driven by economic concerns to choose PAD,
rather than concerns with the quality of life and/or of death; on the other hand, the
financial burden that intensive medical care can impose on those who lack either health
insurance or substantial personal resources is often quite real, and it would be hard to say
that patients who take this into account are behaving irrationally.
Although the Massachusetts bill implicates this issue, a textual ambiguity leaves
uncertain whether the bill resolves it. The bill's language leaves unclear whether a
decision to select PAD due to financial difficulties constitutes "distorted" judgment under
153 Am. J. PsvcillAIRV 1469 (1996); see also Carl H. Coleman A: Alan R. Fleischman,
Guidelinesfor Physician-Assisted Suicide: Can the Challenge Be Mel'. 24 J. L. MKD. & ETHICS
217, 221 (1996) (concluding that "it is doubtful that this line will be drawn consistently from one
case to the next").
" 1997 MA H.B. 1543 § 12EE(aK3)(A).
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the bill (and therefore disqualifies the individual fi-om PAD), or whether financial
difficulties are merely a factor that can, in some circumstances, lead to the "distortion" of
the patient's judgment (such that he would be disqualified fi"om receiving PAD).
b. Procedural Protections .
Following the Harvard Model Law," the Illinois, Massachusetts, and Maine bills
would require that a patient seeking PAD obtain a consultation with a mental health
professional in order to insure that the patient can pass the "impaired judgment"
standard.'* Connecticut, Hawaii, Michigan, Oregon, Vermont, and Wisconsin, in
contrast, assign to the patient's treating physician the responsibility of determining
whether a mental health consultation is necessary. Most of these bills are drafted to
require the physician to obtain a mental health consult if he believes a patient may be
suffering from a mental disorder or depression that is impairing her judgment." Some of
the bills specify that any mental health consult may be with a psychiatrist, clinical
psychologist, or social worker,'* while others require such a consult to be with a
psychiatrist or psychologist." The outlier on this issue is the Washington bill, which fails
to provide explicitly for a consultation with a mental health professional under any
circumstances - the determination of whether the patient is mentally competent to request
PAD is left to the treating physicians.'*"
^' Baron, et al., supra note 7, at 29 (5(b)).
^^ 1997 MA H.B. 1543 § 12GG(b); 1997 ME H.B. 663 § 5-906; 1997 IL H.B. 691 § 25(2).
" OR Act §3.03; 1997 HI H.B. 2204 § 6.; 1997MIS.B. 81 § 11; 1997 WI A.B. 32 § 156.11;
1997 VT H.B. 109 § 5284; 1997 CT H.B. 6083 § (4)(2). The Maine bill merdy permits (but
does not require) the treating physician to refer the patient to a mental health professional in order
to insure that the "impaired judgment" test is met. 1997 ME H.B. 663 § 5-906.
^* 1997 ME H.B. 663 § 5-902(F); 1997 MA H.B. 1543 § 12GG(b); 1997 CT H.B. 6083 § 4(2).
^' OR Act § 1.01(4); 1997 HI H.B. 2204 § 1; 1997MIS.B. 81 § 11; 1997 WI A.B. 32 § 156.11;
1997 VT H.B. 109 § 1(3). A proposed initiative in Michigan would require the consultation be
with a licensed psychiatrist. MI Initiative § 5676(2)(c).
*° 5eeWAS.B. §5(1),(4).
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Requinng mental health consultations for all patients requesting PAD would, of
course, increase the procedural red-tape that will no doubt accompany PAD. The
cautionary argument for mandatory mental health consultations, however, seems
compelling: a patient's treating physician will often have little or no training or
experience dealing with clinical depression or other mental health problems, and relying
on the judgment of such physicians concerning whether a mental competence evaluation
by a trained professional is necessary would probably substantially increase the risk that
PAD would be granted to incompetent patients/'
As is the case with the young, none of the eleven state bills explicitly consider
whether patients suffering from impaired judgment (and are thus ineligible to opt for
PAD) are strictly excluded from receiving PAD, or whether some form of substitutive
judgment (provided by a guardian preselected by the patient or appointed after the patient
becomes incompetent) is possible, although the Washington bill strongly suggests there
can be no substitutive judgment. ''^ Future PAD legislation should explicitly address this
question. The problem, though, lacks a simple solution. From the perspective of
horizontal equity, if PAD is generally available, it would seem unfair to deny some
individuals the right solely because they suffer a mental impairment. On the other hand,
prudence dictates that legislatures exercise extreme caution when permitting a legal
representative of an impaired patient to request PAD on behalf of the patient. The
prospect of substituted judgment is especially troubling because most representatives
selected by the patient or appointed by a court likely would be relatives with a financial
interest in the patient's estate, and therefore have a potential conflict of interest if
L'f. Y. C oiiucll and F-. D. Caine. Rational Suicide and the Rii^hi to Die-Rcalin and Myth. 325
N.E.J.M. 1 100 ( 199 1 ) (reporting that priniar> care physicians underdiagnose depression in elderly
patients); David Clark, Rational Suicide and People with Terminal Conditions or Disabilities, 8
ISSUES IN L. & Me:d. 147 (1992) (same).
*' WAS.B.§4(1).(2).
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permitted to make life and death decisions on the patient's behalf. It bears noting,
however, that despite the same possible abuses associated with substitutive decision
making, surrogates are currently permitted (under certain circumstances) to request the
withdrawal of life support systems from incapacitated patients.'*^
4. Residency Requirements.
When Oregon voters enacted that state's Death With Dignity Act, Oregon became
the only state to legalize PAD. It was perhaps not surprising, given this fact, that the Act
limited eligibility for the procedure to residents of the state. ''^ Presumably, the residency
provision was added to the initiative to assuage fears that Oregon would be flooded with
terminally ill patients from other states who wanted to take advantage ofPAD but could
not do so at home. The state bills infroduced since the enactment of the Oregon initiative
have split evenly on the question of whether residency should be required for program
eligibility. The Hawaii, Michigan, Vermont, Wisconsin and Maine bills follow Oregon's
lead in restricting eligibility to residents"^; the Michigan and Maine bills would require
that a patient reside in the state for 6 months prior to being granted PAD,"* while the other
bills (along with the Oregon Act) do not themselves specify the requirements for
residency under the law. The Connecticut, Illinois, Massachusetts, Nebraska and
Washington bills, following the lead of the Harvard Model Law, do not contain a
residency requirement.
Although a residency requirement is an issue that should be considered when
PAD legislation is drafted, it is not obvious why a state that wishes to provide the option
See generally Coleman & Fleischman, supra note 33, at 220-21.
44
45
OR Act § 1.01(11).
1997 ME H.B. 663 § 5-902(N); 1997 HI H.B. 2204 § 1 (limiting "qualified patients" to
residents of the state); 1997 MI S.B. 81 § 8(5)(C); 1997 Wl A.B. 32 § 156.03
*' 1997 ME H.B. 663 §5-913.
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of PAD to its ow-n citizens would wish to exclude outsiders, other than as a means of
reassuring citizens or legislators with strong reser\ations about PAD legislation that the
procedure would not be administered very often. Unlike welfare benefits that are funded
by the state treasur> , PAD does not threaten to have a major fiscal impact on the state. It
is conceivable that states that enact PAD legislation might see an influx of terminally ill
patients who would qualify for Medicaid, and thus an impact on state finances is possible.
This potential problem, however, would seem better addressed through limitations on
eligibility for Medicaid than through limitations on eligibility for PAD.
In addition, residency requirements in this context are Constitutionally suspect.
NMiile it is unclear how Constitutional challenges to residency provisions would
ultimately be resolved, such pro\isions are almost certain to be challenged as violating
the U.S. Constitution's privileges and immunities clause.*^
The Supreme Court has established a two-part test for determining whether a state
law that discriminates against non-residents of the state violates the privileges and
immunities clause. First, courts will consider whether the opportunity denied to non-
residents is one that falls within the scope of the clause. If the answer is yes, courts will
then ask whether the state as a substantial interest in treating non-residents differently -
more specifically, whether non-residents are a "peculiar source of the evil at which the
statute is aimed."'''' In the context of residency requirements for PAD, it is the former
inquir>' that is likely to present the difficult question (it seems quite unlikely that a state
would be able to demonstrate, under the second prong of the test, that non-residents
*''
U.S. Const. Art. IV., § 2, cl. 1 ("TTie Citizens of each State shall be entitled to ail Privileges
and Immunities of Citizens in the several States.").
" See generally, RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, 2 TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL
Law: Substance and Procedure 108 (2d. ed, 1992).
*' Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 388, 396 ( i 948).
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requesting PAD might present problems not caused by residents who might request
PAD.)
The privileges and immunities clause does not protect non-residents from all
forms of discrimination ~ only discrimination in contexts that are "in their nature,
fundamental."'^ Although this standard is exacting, it is not so strict as to require non-
discrimination only where Constitutionally protected rights are at stake,'' so the Supreme
Court's rulings in Glucksberg and Quill that PAD is not guaranteed by the Constitution
do not resolve the question of whether non-residents are protected by the privileges and
immunities clause from discrimination in PAD legislation. In attempting to draw the line
between what is sufficiently fundamental for privileges and immimities clause protection
and what is not, the Supreme Court has held that states cannot require private employers
(even those working under a government contract) to give hiring preference to residents
without running afoul of the clause,'^ but they may discriminate against out-of-staters in
the granting of licenses for recreational sports, such as hunting and fishing," and they
may restrict welfare benefits to residents.''* While residency requirements in PAD
legislation seem to bear an important similarity to resident preferences in private
employment legislation, in the sense that employment and death are both central issues in
every individual's life, the High Court has never invoked the privileges and immunities
clause to protect non-residents in the context of a law relating to death or to privacy,
rather than one related to economic activity or commerce.
'" Corfield v. Coryell, 6 Fed. Gas. 546, 551 (E.D. Pa. 1823).
" Rotunda & Nowak, supra note 46, at 1 09.
" United Building and Construction Trades Council v. Camden, 465 U.S. 208 (1981).
" Baldwin v. Fish and Game Comm'n of Montana, 436 U.S. 371 (1978).
" See ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 46, at 109.
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111. Pb>sician Qualincatiun<) and Responsibilities
1 The Prescribing Physician
Legislation could reasonably limit the class of physicians permined to provide
PAD. Under one theory , PAD is best provided by a physician v,i\h a longstanding
professional relationship vsith the patient, ensuring that the physician knows the "whole"
patient, not merely the manifestation of a disease process." Under a very different
theory, PAD is best provided by physicians skilled in pain management. One claim
levied by some opponents of PAD is that the practice would be requested only rarely if
terminally ill patients received more skillful treatment for pain.*" This suggests that such
limitations on the provision of PAD could potentially minimize its attractiveness. Even
most supporters of PAD believe that attempts at palliative care should be exhausted
before assisted suicide is considered.'^ To date, however, none of the state bills has
limited in any meaningful way the class of physicians who may respond to a request for
PAD, or even would require a consultation with a palliative care specialist before PAD is
provided, as one group of commentators has proposed.'* All of the bills require only that
a participating physician be licensed to practice medicine in the state and have some
responsibility for the treatment of the terminally ill patient.''
See Baron, et al, supra note 7, at 17.
See, e.g., Robert G. Twycross, f^'here There is Hope There is Life: A Viewfrom the Hospice, in
Euthanasia Examined: Ethical, Clinical, and Legal Perspectives 141 (John Keown. ed.
1995) (arguing that adequate pain relief is feasible for virtually all cancer patients, and that
among such patients virtually all requests for PAD are due to treatable depressive disorders); see
also Kamisar, supra note 16, at 235-36; American Medical Ass'n Council on Scientific Affairs,
Good Care ofthe Dying Patient, 275 J.A.M.A. 474, 475 (1996);.
See, e.g., Franklin G. Miller, et a!., Can Physician-Assisted Suicide Be Regulated Effectively?,
24 J. L. Med. & ETHICS 225. 225 ( 1 996).
Id. at 226 ("The most important safeguard is consultation with an independent physician,
skilled in palliative care..."); 5ee a/50 Miller, et al., supra noxt 8.
The Washington bill provides some limitations unrelated to this specific problem, requiring the
"attending physician" to not be related to the patient, not be entitled to any portion of the patient's
estate, and not have an> creditor's claims against the patient. WA S.B. § 3(2)(a)-(c).
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A proposed PAD initiative in Michigan, which supporters are currently
attempting to qualify for the state ballot, takes a positive though incomplete step toward
ensuring that physicians who participate in PAD have at least minimal knowledge of
modem advances in palliative care. The draft initiative provides that two years after it
takes effect physicians that participate in PAD must complete 20 hours of continuing
medical education "in the theory and practice of comfort care, hospice care, pain control,
sedation coma, removal of nutrition and hydration, psychiatric counseling, and the
prescription to medications authorized by this part" in order to renew their licenses,^'* as
well as four additional hours of such continuing education at the time of each subsequent
license renewal.^' It is questionable whether these education requirements are
sufficiently stringent, but at the very least the initiative's requirements should serve as a
starting point for discussion about what specialized training and expertise is appropriate
to require of physicians who participate in PAD.
2. The Qualifications of the Consulting Physician .
As discussed above, ten of the state proposals require at least one "second
opinion" to confirm that the patient's condition satisfies the statutory definition of
"terminal."" The majority of bills provide no firm restrictions on the qualifications of
consulting physicians other than that they (like the treating physicians) be licensed to
practice medicine in the state. Consistent with the obvious purpose of requiring a second
opinion, the Oregon, Connecticut, Hawaii, Maine, Michigan, Vermont, Washington, and
Wisconsin bills would require that the consulting physician possess "expertise" or
experience in treating the disease that has caused the patient to become terminal and be
^° MIlnitiative§ 5687(1)
" MI Initiative § 5687(2).
" See Pan 11(1), supra.
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capable of making a professional diagnosis, but none of the bills define these terms."
The proposed Michigan ballot initiative would provide more structure to the requirements
of expertise and experience by requiring that the consulting opinion be provided by a
physician certified as a specialist in the patient's disease by the relevant specialty board,
as well as being currently active in that Sf)ecialty area.** If the patient suffers from
cancer, the initiative would require that the consulting physician be an oncologist. This
more specific definition of expertise is desirable because it removes the uncertainty that
would otherwise often surround the question of whether a given physician had the
appropriate expertise or experience to serve as a consulting physician ~ uncertainty that
could make potential consulting physicians nervous about assuming that role and/or
attending physicians reluctant to rely on confirming opinions of consulting physicians.
The Maine and Washington bills provide an interesting gloss on the role of the
consulting physician, perhaps anticipating that these physicians can provide a check on
an attending physician's potential conflicts of interest in addition to providing a
confirming diagnosis. The Washington bill prohibits practice partners of the attending
physician from serving as a consulting physician (although the two physicians may be
members of the same health maintenance organization)** while the Maine bill provides
that the consulting physician "may not be a partner or similar business associate of the
attending physician" or even "have an office in the same building as the attending
physician."*'
" OR Act § 1.01(3); 1997 ME H.B. 663 §. 1(D); 1997 HI H.B. 2204 § 1; 1997MIS.B. 81 §
8(30XC); 1997 WI A.B. 32 § 156.09.; 1997 VT H.B. 109 § 5280(2); 1997 WA S.B. 5654 § 3(3).
*" Ml Initiative § 5673(D).
"mi Initiative §5676(2X0)
** 1997 WA S.B. 5654 §3(cKd).
" 1997 ME H.B. 663 § 1(D).
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3. Physician Presence at the Time of Death
Dedication to the value of patient care and comfort suggests that the physician
who prescribes the lethal dose of medication be permitted to be present when the patient
takes her own life.*' On the other hand, permitting physicians to be present at the time of
death risks subtle (and perhaps not so subtle) coercion of patients who have an eleventh-
hour inclination to reconsider hastening their deaths. Furthermore, physician attendance
at the patient's bedside at the time the patient's life is taken could easily blur the line
between PAD and voluntary euthanasia. Despite the firm desire of most of the state bills
to prohibit voluntary euthanasia, none of the bills that explicitly address this issue have
opted to preclude the attending physician fi-om witnessing a patient's death. Connecticut,
Illinois, Massachusetts, Michigan, and Vermont provide that the physician may be
present at the time of death.*' Following the Harvard Model Law,™ Connecticut, Illinois
and Massachusetts go so far as to state that the physician may "assist" the patient in
making use of the means to hasten death, so long as the "actual use" is a "voluntary
physical act" of the patient.^' The Maine bill would go even further, requiring the
responsible physician to be present when the patient self-administers the lethal
medication.^^
*^ See Baron, et a!., supra note 7, at 21 ("We hope that the responsible physician will be present
at the patient's death in order to reassure the patient and to make certain that the process is carried
out effectively.").
^' 1997 MA H.B. 1543 § 12EE(c) (providing that the responsible physician "may, if the patient
so requests, be present at the time that the patient makes use of the means [of death]"); 1997 MI
S.B. 81 § 8(21) (providing that "a person" shall not be subject to liability for "being present
when an individual takes medication prescribed to end his or her life . . .").
™ Baron et al., supra note 7, at 27 (§ 3(b)).
" 1997 IL H.B. 691 § 15(b).
" 1997 ME H.B. 663 § 5-904(K).
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4. Physicians NMio Wish Not to Participate in PAD .
Consistent with the principle of individual autonomy that underlies the argument
in favor of PAD, none of the state bills would require that a physician who receives a
request for PAD provide the patient with the means of death. The Illinois bill, for
example, includes a "Provider's Freedom of Conscience" clause, which explicitly
provides that physicians who object to PAD may not be required to participate or aid in
PAD.''
Freedom of conscience for physicians seems clearly a proper principle for
legislation that is ultimately grounded in respect for individual autonomy. But a more
difficult question is whether a physician who receives a request for PAD and declines to
fulfill the request should have an affirmative duty to refer to the patient to a physician
who is willing. To resolve this issue, legislatures must trade-off requiring a doctor who is
morally opposed to PAD to assume some complicity in the matter (even if she is
absolved from having to write the prescription herself) against the possibility that a
terminally ill requesting patient may not have the wherewithal to locate on his own a
willing physician. The majority of bills have not imposed on conscientious objectors an
affirmative duty to refer a requesting patient; some are silent on the question. ''* while
others affirmatively provide that there is no duty to refer." Tlie Wisconsin bill takes the
contrar)' position, however, imposing on an attending physician who declines to fialfiU a
" 1997 IL H.B. 691 § 55; see also 1997 ME H.B. 663 § 5-91 8(D) ("A health care provider is not
under a duty, whether b> contract, by law or by ans other legal requirement, to provide
medication to end the patient's life. . ."); 1997 MA H.B. 1543 § MM (a) ("no individual who is
opposed to providing a patient w ith medical means ma> be required to do so. . .").
OR Act § 4.01(4) (providing that if a physician refuses to grant a PAD request and he must
transfer "upon request" the patients medical records); 1997 ME H.B. 663 § 5-918(DKproviding
that if a physician refuses to grant a patients request for PAD and the patient transfers to the care
of another physician, the initial physician must transfer the patient's medical records); 1997 MI
S.B. 81 § 8(24) (same); 1997VTil.B. I09§ 5293(D) (same).
" 1997 MA H.B. i543§MM(c).
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request for PAD a duty "make a good-faith attempt to transfer the requester's care and
treatment to another physician . . . who will comply with the requester's request . . . .'"*
The Washington bill appears to impose the same requirement, although its language is
somewhat less clear^''
Potentially more significant than whether individual physicians may decline to
provide PAD is whether hospitals or other health care organizations can prohibit
physicians who use their facilities from providing PAD in those facilities. Here, the
institution's claim to the autonomy to decline to participate in PAD can conflict wdth
physician's claims to the autonomy to provide PAD. This theoretical problem is
accentuated by the more practical problem that it would often be more difficult for a
patient whose request for PAD is denied by an institution to change institutions than it
would be for a patient whose request is denied by a physician to switch physicians. On
the other hand, however, if institutions are permitted to opt out ofPAD, terminally ill
patients would have the opportunity to pre-select health care providers based on whether
providers will or will not provide PAD. The ability to select an institution that prohibits
the practice could provide peace of mind to patients (and their loved ones) who opposed
PAD but fear being subjected to an early death because of a mistake, coercion, or loss of
mental competence; the ability to select a provider that supports PAD could increase the
confidence of patients who strongly favor the practice that, should they ever request
PAD, their request would be honored.
Most of the legislative proposals to date grant without comment or explanation
the same freedom of conscience to health care facilities as they grant to individual
providers,^* and in so doing fail to confront the arguments against facility freedom that
'.' 1997 WI A.B. 32 § 156.07(9)
^' 1997 WA S.B. 5654 § 11.
'* 1997 MI S.B. 81 § 8(24) and § 8(30)(D) (defining "health care provider"); 1997 HI H.B. 2204
sec. 18(4) and sec. 1 (defining "health care provider"); 1997 ME H.B. 663 § 5-9 19(D) and § 5-
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are not applicable to provider freedom. The Illinois and Massachusetts bills langentially
touch on this problem by providing that a health care facility may prohibit its staff
members from providing PAD if it gives reasonable notice of the policy to the staff
members.'^ This notice requirement is useful, but the bills are still deficient on this issue
because they do not require that notice of a facility's "no-PAD" policy be given to
patients. They are further deficient because their text leaves unclear whether a physician
with staff privileges constitutes a "staff member" under the statutes and can thus be
prohibited by a facility from providing PAD, or whether such a physician, as an
independent contractor, would be unaffected by the provision.
The Michigan ballot initiative best addresses these problems and strikes a balance
between the needs of health care facilities and patients by permitting facilities to prohibit
PAD but only if it (1 ) provides notice of its policy to the public as well as its staff, (2)
transfers patients to facilities that do permit PAD within 48 hours of a patient's request
for PAD, and (3) does not attempt to prohibit its staff from providing PAD outside the
facility.*"
IV. The Patient's Request for PAD
PAD legislation offers individuals the choice of ending their lives in certain
situations, thus promoting individual autonomy; its greatest challenge is protecting the
autonomy of those who do not wish to take advantage of this option. There is nearly
universal agreement that responsible PAD legislation must ensure that decisions to opt
for PAD are informed, thoughtfully considered, and fully voluntary. The irreversible
902(G) (defining "health care provider"); see also WA S.B. 5654 § 14(b) (health care faciiit>' may
disciphne employee who acts contrar> to facility's policy).
" 1997 MA H.B, 1543 § MM(b); 1997 IL H.B. 691 § 55(b).
** MI Initiative § 5688(6KA)-(C).
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nature ofPAD counsels that legislation, in so doing, should err on the side of excessive
caution. Protection of patients^om PAD can come in three forms: (1) protection from a
mistake or administrative error that results in PAD being administered by accident; (2)
protection from the coercive or undue influence of third parties who have their own
interests rather than the patients' interests at heart; and (3) protection from the patient
herself, who might opt for PAD out of a lack of information or to satisfy a fleeting desire
even when doing so comes at the expense of a confrary, more stable preference for
continued life. Request procedures, waiting periods, informed consent provisions, and
witness requirements each can offer one or more of these types of protections.
1 . Request Procedures .
Perhaps the most feared types of harm that can result from the legalization of
PAD are innocent miscommunications, in which the physician mistakenly believes that
the patient has requested PAD, and physicians taking it upon themselves to hasten death
when the patient cannot or does not request it. Limiting right-to-die legislation to PAD,
in which the patient must self-administer the lethal dosage of medication, rather than
permitting active voluntary euthanasia, reduces the likelihood that either type of harm
will result in a fatality, but this precaution is not foolproof: an elderly or ill patient is
likely to take the medication that his doctor prescribes without questioning the
prescription. All of the state bills place requirements on the method of requesting PAD
and/or the number of requests required, safeguards that can be understood as reducing the
potential for fatal error as well as overreaching.
All eleven state bills provide that at least one request for PAD made by a patient
to her attending physician must be recorded in some way. Most of the bills (Oregon,
Hawaii, Maine, Michigan, Nebraska," Vermont, Wisconsin, Massachusetts) require that
The Nebraska bill requires an advanced directive for voluntary euthanasia, which must be in
writing. 1997 NE L.B. 406 § 3(3). .
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a request be made in vsriting. This approach provides a safeguard against mistaken
administration of PAD, but it does so at the risk of excluding from PAD patients too ill to
place their request in writing.*" The Connecticut, Illinois, and Washington bills avoid
this problem by providing the patient with the option of recording her request on video
tape instead of placing it in writing." The video-tape option, which gives the patient
flexibility in how to make her request for PAD wathout reducing the protection against
error or overreaching, seems quite appropriate. Nine of the bills (all except Connecticut
and Nebraska) provide an additional safeguard against mistaken administration of PAD
by requiring the patient to request PAD on at least two separate occasions,*" although all
of these permit one of the requests to be oral. It is not clear why, if at least two different
requests must be made, the bills do not require them both to be in the same medium. If a
second request is in fact an important safeguard,*" the marginal inconvenience of
requiring that request to be in writing or on videotape seems quite small.
*" The Washington bill permits a patient to designate a representative to sign the written request
if the patient is unable to do so. WA S.B. § 4(4). This procedure eliminates the concern that the
incapacitated will not be able to request PAD, but it creates additional concerns as to the
voluntariness of requests.
" 1997 WA S.B. 5654 § 4(5); 1997 CT H.B, 6083 § 2(aX3XD). The Illinois bill would permit
the actual requests for PAD to be made orally, but would require the physician to document a
hold discussion with the patient the covers all the information the patient would need to make an
informed choice of PAD and to document that discussion either on videotape or in a writing
signed by the patient. 1997 IL H.B. § 20(4).
The Massachusetts bill requires a request be made on three separate occasions. 1997 MA H.B.
1543 § 12EE(D); Wisconsin and Vermont would require two oral and one written requests. 1997
WI A.B. 32 § 156.13(3); 1997 VT H.B. 109 § 5287.
The second request requirement can be seen as means to require a waiting period between the
time the patient requests PAD and when it is administered (an issue discussed, infra), rather than
as a safeguard that protects against involuntar> PAD. However, waiting periods could be created
merely by requiring time to elapse between a single PAD request and the physician's provision of
a prescription. There is nothing inherent in the concept of waiting periods that requires multiple
requests.
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2. Waiting Periods .
Requiring that requests for PAD be made in writing or on video tape reduces the
Ukelihood of administrative error leading to an unwanted administration of PAD, but this
safeguard does not protect patients from hastily electing PAD when their preference for
death might be transitory rather than stable. The nine bills that require at least two
requests for PAD attempt to mitigate this risk by mandating a minimum waiting period
between the time that the requests are made. All but one bill require a waiting period of
1 4 or 1 5 days,** a seemingly minimal period of enforced reflection, considering the
finality of a patient's decision to choose PAD. The Washington bill is an outlier on this
issue, require a waiting period of only 72 hours between the two patient requests that are
required before a physician can prescribe a lethal dose of medication."
3. Informed Consent .
In attempts to insure that patient requests for PAD are not only stable but also
well-informed, all of the bills except for Nebraska's specify certain information that must
be communicated by the attending physician to the patient before the patient's request
may be honored. All ten of these require that the physician review with the patient her
diagnosis, prognosis, and other available medical options ~ the Washington bill requires
that the consulting physician do so as well.** The majority of bills also explicitly require
the attending physician to review with the patient options for palliative care including
hospice and/or pain control possibilities (Oregon, Illinois, Hawaii, Maine, Michigan,
*^ 1997 ILH.B. 691 § 15(a)(3)(D); 1997MAH.B. 1543 § 12EE(D)(14 days); OR Act § 3.08 (15
days and at least 48 hours after the written request is made); 1997 ME H.B. 663 § 5-909, 5-911
(same); 1997 HI H.B. 2204 § 1 1 (same); 1997 WI A.B. 32 § 156.07(7)(b) & 156.13(3)(b)
(same); 1997 VT H.B. 109 § 5289 (same). The Michigan bill states that the patient shall repeat
his request for PAD "within" (rather than "no sooner than") 15 days of the initial request, 1997
MI S.B. 81 § 8(7), but also provides that "at least 15 days shall elapse between the patient's initial
oral request and the writing of a prescription...." Id. at § 8(15).
*' 1997 WA S.B. 5654 §4(3).
** 1997 WA S.B. 5654 § 5(5).
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Vermont, Washington, Wisconsin)." In order to guarantee that this information is not
only communicated by the physician but also understood by the patient, many of the bills
require that the patient's written request for PAD (or videotaped request, where
applicable) include a recitation that the physician has discussed the required issues with
them*
WTiile all of the bills require the attending physician to present the patient with
certain types of information that might dissuade her from PAD prior to granting her
request, the Massachusetts legislation is unique in requiring the attending physician to
refer the patient elsewhere for such information. That legislation would require the
physician to refer a requesting patient to a social worker (or equivalent) "to determine
whether services are available to the patient that could improve the patient's
circumstances sufficiently to cause the patient to reconsider his or her request. . ."" The
Illinois bill requires the physician to "offer" the patient the opportunity for this type of
consultation,'* but its language lacks the implication carried by the Massachusetts bill that
the patient must agree to the consultation before the physician may administer PAD.
*" OR Act § 3.01(e); 1997 IL H.B. 691 § 20(1); 1997 ME H.B. 663 § 5-904(CX5); 1997 MI S.B.
81 § 8(9)(B)(V); 1997 HI H.B. 2204 § 4(E); 1997 WI A.B. 32 § 156.07(2)(e); 1997 VT H.B.
109 § 1(6XE); 1997 VT H.B. 109 § 5282(E); 1997 WA S.B. 5654 § 5(2), (5), (8).
'^ See, e.g., 1997 ME H.B. 663 § 5-920 (requiring that the request for PAD must include
statements that the physician has explained to the patient her diagnosis, prognosis, alternative
treatments (including hospice and comfort care), and that the patient makes the request
voluntarily and with the understanding that she may revoke the request at any time); 1997 HI
H.B. 2204 § 21 (substantively identical); 1997 MAH.B. 1543 § 12FF(d)(3) (requiring the
responsible physician to document in writing (signed by the patient and witnesses ) or by audio or
video tape (during which both the patient and the witnesses are present) the content of his
discussion with the patient of the patient's prognosis and treatment options); 1997 IL H.B. 691 §
20(c) (requiring the physician to document the informed consent discussion with a writing signed
by the patient or a videotape of the discussion).
" 1997 MA H.B. 1543 § 12FF(b).
" 1997 IL H.B. 691 §20(2).
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4. Witness Requirements.
All eleven bills require that the patient's written or taped request for PAD be
witnessed. Most agree that a minimum of two witnesses must observe this request,
although the Wisconsin bill would require three and the Connecticut bill only one." All
of the bills specify that at least one witness (and in most cases both witnesses) may not be
entitled to "any portion" of the patient's estate either by will or by operation of law, and
all but the Washington bill speciiy that at least one (and in most cases both) may not be
employed by the hospital or other organization providing care or residence to the
patient.'" Nine bills would require that at least one of the witnesses (and in most cases
both wimesses) not be related to the patient'^ (Connecticut and Massachusetts lack this
restriction), and a smaller majority of the bills would also disqualify the attending
physician as a witness.^ While the majority of bills require witnesses to observe the
patient's request, the Massachusetts and Illinois bills go further by requiring the
witnesses to observe the physician's informed consent discussion with the patient.'^ This
latter approach would appear to be helpful not only in reducing the risk of patient
'M997WIA.B. § 156.05(l)(c).
'' OR Act §2.02(2)(c); 1997 ME H.B. 663 § 5-903(B)(l); 1997 HI H.B. 2204 § 3(b); 1997 MI
S.B. 81 § 8(8); 1997 MA H.B. 1543 § 12FF(d)(l); 1997 IL H.B. 691 § 20(4)(A); 1997 WI A.B.
32 § 156.05(2)(a); 1997 NE L.B. 406 § 4(2); 1997 VT H.B. 109 § 5281(B). The Washington
bill specifies that no witness may be the attending physician or "an employee of the attending
physician," 1997 WA S.B. 5654 § (4)(5)(d), but employees of hospitals or other health care
facilities are not expressly precluded from serving as witnesses.
'^ OR Act § 2.02(2)(a); 1997 HI H.B. 2204 § 3(b). Under the Maine, Nebraska, Vermont,
Washington, and Wisconsin bills, neither witness may be related to the patient. 1997 ME H.B.
691 § 5-903(B)(l)(I); 1997 NE L.B. 406 § 4)(2); 1997 Wl A.B. 32 § 156.05(2)(1); 1997 VT
H.B. 109 § 5281(B); 1997 WA S.B. 5654 § 4(5)(a).
''' OR Act § 2.02(3); 1997 ME H.B. 663 § 5-903(B)(2); 1997 HI H.B. 2204 § 3(C); 1997 VT H.B.
109 § 5281(B)(4); 1997 WA S.B. 5654 § (4)(5)(d); 1997 MA H.B. 1543 § 12FF(d)(l) (requiring
that at least one of two witnesses not be "affiliated with any person that is involved in the care of
the patient").
'' 1997 MA H.B. 1543 § 12FF(d)(l); 1997 IL H.B. 691 § 20(4)(A), 20(4)(C).
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misunderstanding or patienl/physician miscommunication, but also in assuring that the
patient's choice of PAD is an informed and considered one.
The bills diverge in their specification of what precisely the witness must attest to,
and thus, implicitly, what harms the wimess requirement is intended to protect against.
All of the bills presume that the vsimesses will attest that the patient actually made the
request for PAD, but a minority also include provisions requiring witnesses to certify that
the patient's election was voluntar>' and did not result from coercion or undue influence."
While these provisions are laudatory in their effort to protect voilnerable patients from
feeling pressured to "choose" PAD, the guidance that they provide to potential witnesses
is troublingly vague: none specify what would constitute "coercion," "undue influence,"
or lack of "voluntariness." If a witness believes that a patient's decision to elect PAD
was influenced by the request of emotionally or financially exhausted family members,
for example, could the witness appropriately certify that the patient was not the subject of
undue influence or coercion? The lack of clarity on this point is a major weakness in all
of the bills prop)osed to date.
None of the proposed bills adequately address another complication caused by the
witness requirements: there will inevitably be patients who wish to request PAD who
have no disinterested friends to serve as wimesses. The restrictions on witness service of
relatives, individuals with a financial interest in the patient's estate, employees of the
health care organization caring for the patient, and the attending physician would
severely restrict many patients' likely witness pools. This could, perhaps, render a lack
of available, qualified witnesses a fairly common stumbling block to the administration
of PAD. Restrictions that prevent "representatives" of the health care organization
providing care from serving as wimesses are particularly troublesome in this regard, as
they make uncertain whether a health care provider may even recruit disinterested non-
" 1997 ME H.B, 663 § 5-903(b); 1997 HI H.B. 2204 § 3(a); 1997 Ml S.B. 81 § 8(8).
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employees to serve as witnesses for PAD requests. Terminally ill patients who are
bedridden and do not have family or friends to call on might have few other options for
locating individuals to witness their requests.
The Oregon, Hawaii, and Maine bills partially address this problem by providing
that if the patient is a resident of long-term care facility, the facility may designate (with
some restrictions) one of the necessary witnesses," but this provision, of course, only
helps certain patients, and at best only solves halfthe problem of locating two witnesses.
The Wisconsin bill would establish a class of persons called "patient's advocates" who
may potentially constitute all of a patient's witnesses, but this provision, too, would only
apply to residents of nursing homes or other residential-care facilities.""
Conclusion
As advocates ofPAD take their battle to state legislatures in the wake of the
Supreme Court's determination that the issue should be resolved in the political rather
than the legal arena, they will have to move beyond high-level arguments for autonomy
in life and dignity in death. Legislative recognition ofPAD must be preceeded by the
resolution of a series of difficult implementation issues that PAD would create. Recent
attempts to legalize PAD by statute, along with the Oregon Death with Dignity Act, can
serve as a starting point for these discussions and debates. While the body of proposed
legislation on the subject is helpfiil in identifying what the key implementation issues are,
it is often far from successful in resolving those issues at a satisfactory level of
specificity. For a PAD regime to succeed in practice, future legislation must surpass the
existing proposed legislation in its ability to resolve these difficult implementation issues.
^ OR Act § 2.02(4); 1997 ME H.B. 663 § 5-903(B)(3); 1997 HI H.B. 2204 § 21 note.
"'° 1997 WI A.B. 32 § 156.05(2)(b), § 156.19.
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